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This paper examines one component of Stephen Mumford’s case for the claim that we should regard sport, art and the aesthetic as more closely connected than has tended to be the case, under the influence of the work of David Best, in recent years. Mumford’s rejection of what I call ‘the drama argument’ is examined in detail and it is argued that all but one element of his case fails to do the job he envisages.





Stephen Mumford’s work on what he calls ‘purism’ in sport spectatorship begins from, and is elaborated in terms of, a rejection of two arguments Mumford finds in Best (1978) – what I have called elsewhere, ‘the principal aim argument’ (Culbertson, forthcoming), which distinguishes between ‘purposive’ and ‘aesthetic’ sports on the basis of the claim that they have different principal aims, and the ‘drama argument’, which concludes that we should understand talk of drama in sport as involving an importantly different use of the term ‘drama’ compared to the use we make of it in relation to the theatre, film or television drama.​[1]​ This paper will consider Mumford’s rejection of the drama argument. Unlike the principal aim argument, Mumford’s interpretation of the drama argument is not problematic (or at least, not as problematic, see §3 below). Instead, the paper will focus on his reasons for rejecting the drama argument.

The paper will begin (§2) by outlining the drama argument as it is expressed in Best (1978). It will then consider Mumford’s rejection of the drama argument (§3), before evaluating Mumford’s argument for such rejection (§4). It will be argued that Mumford does not provide a suitable argument for his rejection of Best’s position, and that as a consequence one of the major strands in Mumford’s defence of the view that sport, art and the aesthetic are more closely connected than many have tended, following Best, to think, has been undermined.

2. The drama argument

Best (1978: 117-122) discusses ‘dramatic’, ‘tragic’ and their cognates for the purpose of showing that when we talk of events in sport, or even sports or sport in general, as being dramatic, and when we say of some sporting incident or outcome that it was ‘tragic’, then we are using the terms ‘dramatic’ and ‘tragic’ in a way that is importantly different from the way they are used in art (for example, in the theatre, film or television drama). Best (1978: 117) stresses that ‘[t]hese terms [‘dramatic’ and ‘tragic’] are used in a notoriously slippery way’, and, as a consequence, he tries to clarify the different uses we have for those terms.

Best (1978: 117) observes that ‘it is an understood part of the convention that tragedy in a play happens to the fictional characters being portrayed, and not to the actors, i.e. the living people taking part’. In contrasting the fact the actor playing the part of Gloucester in King Lear does not have his eyes put out, while the character (Gloucester) does, with the situation in cases of tragedy in sport, Best (1978: 118) stresses that ‘there is no comparable convention in sport such that it would make sense to say of a serious injury in Rugby that it occurred to the full-back, and not to the man who was playing full-back’.

So Best (1978: 118) draws attention to the convention in art that ‘the object of one’s attention is an imagined object’, and as a consequence, the use of terms such as ‘dramatic’ and ‘tragic’, in the context of art, should be understood ‘as deriving [their] meaning from that convention’. In sport there is no equivalent convention, and that can be shown most perspicuously by the fact that there is no equivalent in sport to the fictional character found in the theatre, film or television drama. If there was such a thing, then not only would the man playing full-back not actually be injured (just the full-back), but when someone achieved something significant in sport that person would not be a suitable subject for praise – so Roger Bannister would not be worthy of praise for running the first sub-four-minute mile, but rather ‘the athlete who completed the first sub-four-minute mile’ (Best, 1978: 118) would be the proper subject of praise for the achievement. Clearly, both of those are nonsensical in the strict sense – they contravene the principal of identity between a particular name, referring term or referring description and that to which it refers, or, to put it another way they fail to appreciate that ‘Roger Bannister’ and ‘the athlete who completed the first sub-four-minute mile’ are one and the same person, as are ‘the full-back’ and ‘the man who was playing full-back’. Failure to appreciate that leads to claims that are meaningless in the strict sense because they do not reflect the logical consequences of their component parts (see Best, 1978: 12-14 and 60-62 for discussions of the role of logical consequence in possession of a concept as opposed to knowing the meaning of a word).

3. Mumford’s rejection of the drama argument

Mumford (2012: 50) claims that ‘[s]port contains what looks for all the world like drama’. Unlike Best (1978), he does not regard the idea that sport can be dramatic as involving a different use of ‘dramatic’ from that which is found in relation to the theatre, film or television drama. He claims (2012: 50) that ‘[r]ather like a theatre play, … there can be many plots, sub-plots and surprises along the way before we get to the end point’, and asks: ‘If a play is art, shouldn’t sport also be considered so for containing an equal measure of drama?’ In addition he wonders whether ‘it might be supposed that the drama [in sport] is all the more intense because it is unscripted and real’ (Mumford, 2012: 50).

Mumford’s argument is, quite frankly, rather difficult to discern (see 2012: 49-56, but also 22 and 47). Much of it is simply the provision of examples of ways in which we might see some similarities between sport and drama, but there are two things that are problematic about that tactic. First, providing examples of similarities between sport and drama does not show that they are not significantly different, in the sense in which Best means, if the difference Best is concerned with is not addressed, but rather a number of other features are invoked to show similarity. There could be many similarities, but if there is one important difference, then that is sufficient for Best’s distinction to be important. Mumford doesn’t tackle Best’s argument, but makes propaganda for a different conclusion, largely ignoring, or misconstruing, the premises of Best’s argument.

Second, it’s not at all clear that the examples Mumford gives of similarities between sport and drama are indeed relevant similarities. On the contrary, they are often cases where we might use the same term, but in a different sense. So they aren’t similarities between sport and drama, but similarities in the words that we use to describe or talk about them. We do sometimes talk of a poor performance as a defeat (many an actor has been defeated by King Lear), but that is a different sense of ‘defeat’ from that we use when we talk of a defeat in sport. Indeed, that is the whole issue in relation to the topic of sport and drama. Best draws attention to the fact that when we talk about sport being ‘dramatic’, we are using the term in a different sense from the use to which we put it in relation to the theatre, film or television drama. To say that we use the term in a different sense is to say that it means something quite different (PI §43), and therefore to say that when we talk of drama on the sports field and drama in the theatre, we say two very different things, the logical consequences of which are different. Failure to see those differences in use and logical consequences leads to poor reasoning, confusion, unhelpful ways of seeing sport and drama, and misleading conclusions.

Mumford’s argument is something like the following [Generally, I have tried to use direct quotations from Mumford to avoid misrepresenting his argument]:

i. Sport can be considered scripted theatre.

ii. Sportspersons can be seen as actors playing an assigned role (‘In a perfectly reasonable sense, sport sees an interplay of characters acting out roles’, Mumford, 2012: 56). 

iii. There is no sharp division between ‘real’ drama in sport and ‘imaginary’ drama in the theatre.

iv. Players and athletes can be injured or defeated, but the same is true of actors, ‘who might sustain accidental injury and find something akin to defeat in a bad performance’ (Mumford, 2012: 56).

v. As with the character in a play who falls in love with the leading lady (but not the actor), ‘[I]t is the sportsperson in their character that wins or loses the match’ (Mumford, 2012: 56).

vi. Outside of sport athletes and players may judge the successes and failures of their lives by other (non-sporting) criteria.

vii. There are, therefore, ‘some closer parallels between art and sport’ (Mumford, 2012: 56); closer than Best accepts.

viii. ‘Drama can be found in other areas of life, outside the arts’ (Mumford, 2012: 56).

ix. ‘Even if the drama of sport were to be indistinguishable in nature from drama in the arts, this would not make sport art’ (Mumford, 2012: 56). 

On the question of whether sport should be regarded as art because it contains drama, Mumford rightly acknowledges that drama in sport does not provide a reason to conclude that sport is art, and he gives one reason why that is the case, namely, that there are other things that contain drama, and which are not art, such as politics, war and everyday lives. He also, correctly, observes that expressions such as ‘the art of politics’ and ‘the theatre of war’ employ ‘art’ and ‘theatre’ in a derivative sense, and should not, therefore, be taken as evidence that politics and war are art. So drama is, he argues, insufficient, in and of itself, for something to constitute art.

It’s important to notice that such a claim would not satisfy Best, because Mumford’s claim that drama is insufficient for art treats ‘drama’ as, perhaps not univocal’,​[2]​ but at least the same in the examples of sport, politics, war, everyday lives and the theatre, but Best disputes the idea that our uses of ‘drama’ are the same in the case of the theatre as they are in the other examples Mumford gives.

Mumford (2012: 51) takes the comparison between the rules of sport and the script of a play seriously, and this leads him to the thought that we can understand players as being like actors playing a role and character according to ‘certain script-like elements of the rules’.

In sport ‘one adopts a certain role’ (2012: 51), so friends often have to adopt the roles of adversaries in competition, and those roles are taken extremely seriously, but when competition ends, the friendship is unaffected. Mumford likens this to actors playing adversarial characters in a play. If one actor has to slap the other in the face during the play, that will not affect their friendship off-stage. Mumford (2012: 51) concludes that ‘[t]he actors, like the sportspersons, accept that the strike and any subsequent injury or pain are administered to the character playing the adversarial role. Injuries are not administered to the opponent qua friend, colleague or human being’.

Mumford also speculates about the possibility that Best has in mind, in making the distinction between sport and drama, the idea that the winners and losers and victories and defeats in sport are real, whereas they are only imaginary in drama. He proceeds to offer examples of ways in which there could be thought to be something akin to winners and losers, and to victories and defeats in drama – by which he seems to mean something like successes and failures. He takes the possibility of such things to show that Best’s distinction is not well founded.

4. Evaluating Mumford’s argument

In §3 the basic elements of Mumford’s argument were outlined. This section will consider each element, plus some additional points of relevance to the evaluation of Mumford’s argument for the rejection of Best’s claim that the terms ‘dramatic’ and ‘tragic’ are used differently in relation to sport than they are in relation to the theatre.

i. Sport can be considered scripted theatre.

Best (1985a: 32) describes the idea that the rules of sport can be thought of as akin to the script in a play as ‘a desperate attempt to prop up a hopeless case’, and stresses that: 

since there are implicit or explicit rules (or antecedent requirements) for almost every activity, that would make almost anything an art form, and thus the criterion vacuous. For instance, are the laws of a country artistic texts? When one drives on the right in the United States and on the left in the United Kingdom, is one offering an artistic interpretation of a text?

The focus of the point can be shifted from the absurdity of seeing rule-following as an artistic interpretation of a text, to the fact that the script of a play does not render a play a rule-governed activity. The script is not the rules of the play, but neither are there implicit rules that can be inferred from the script, such as ‘The person playing Stanley should scream “Stella!” at the top of his voice’. A script is the product of a creative enterprise, and is frequently employed in the theatre as material to be worked creatively insofar as lines and scenes are often omitted, interpreted or re-interpreted. That is not so with rules. One normally can’t choose which rules apply while playing sport (things such as children playing football in the street might be an exception), and the players are not part of decisions about how rules are to be interpreted or re-interpreted.

In drama creative decisions are made for artistic purposes, not necessarily for aesthetic purposes (see Best, 1992: 165-80 and 1985b: 153-68 on the distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic). In other words, the creative decisions are tied to the conventions of theatre. In sport the decisions made in the modification of rules (they already exist) are practical decisions (sometimes morally-laden, Culbertson, 2012: 206), and those decisions are made in the context of the conventions of the sport. The conventions of sport and the conventions of drama, however, are different.

ii. Sportspersons can be seen as actors playing an assigned role. 

Mumford (2012: 56) claims that ‘[i]n a perfectly reasonable sense, sport sees an interplay of characters acting out roles’. But not in the relevant sense – it is not a matter of finding just any connection. There is a difference between a character and a role. The player has a role, but not a character. Also, it’s not obvious that the athlete in an individual sport even has a role. Left-back might be better thought of as a role in the sense of serving a function, rather than in the sense of being a character (such as when we talk of someone taking on the role of King Lear). It’s important not to confuse ‘playing the role of King Lear’ with ‘playing the role of left-back’.

Also, a character may have nothing to do with the life of the actor who plays that character. The same cannot be said of the player, even if he or she is quite different when not playing the sport. As a consequence of the conflation of character and role, there is no place for acting in Mumford’s account of drama in the theatre, film or television drama. Playing a role in the theatre means acting, but playing the role of left-back does not mean acting in the sense in which an actor plays a part, but rather ‘acting’ in the sense in which the person playing goalkeeper acts as the last line of defence. So the fact that ‘role’, ‘acting’, ‘play’, and (perhaps, at a stretch) even ‘character’ may all be used to describe the activities of the actor adopting a role and playing a character in the theatre, and therefore acting, and also to describe the fact that a player adopts the role of left-back, and therefore is acting in the role of left-back, does not mean that ‘role’, ‘acting’, ‘play’ and ‘character’ have the same meaning in describing the activities of the actor as they do in describing the activities of the player.  

iii. There is no sharp division between ‘real’ drama in sport and ‘imaginary’ drama in the theatre.

That very much depends how sharp one wants the divide to be. As Wittgenstein reminds us, we don’t need a razor to cut bread, and using one doesn’t do the job any better. In the unpublished manuscript Ms 120, 9th April 1938, Wittgenstein stresses this when he says ‘I asked him for a bread knife and he gives me a razor blade because it’s sharper’ (also see PI §§70, 71, 77 and 88). The use of ‘drama’ in each case is usually different. That seems a significant enough distinction. 

Somewhat parenthetically, we might also question the notion that drama in sport is ‘real’ and drama in the theatre is ‘imagined’. Of course, drama in the theatre certainly involves imagination, but it isn’t the drama that is imagined. Drama just is an imaginary enterprise; it’s part of the meaning of the word that it involves imagination. In that sense we might say that talk of drama in sport is metaphorical, so the events in sport that we want to say are dramatic are certainly real, but they are only dramatic in a figurative sense. That is not an insignificant matter because thinking of the drama in sport as real and that in the theatre as imaginary entails a picture of drama as something found in everyday life and then portrayed in an imaginary form in the theatre, in film and in television drama. That, however, seems to be to get things the wrong way round. 

It is important to remember that, for Mumford, the identification of drama in sport is an important part of his argument for sport having a closer relationship to the aesthetic than we tend to assume. However, the very idea that there is real and imagined drama seems to treat the two forms of drama as significantly different, and does so in a way that suggests that the features (creativity, imagination, acting, etc.) that might seem to be appropriate to the aesthetic, are missing from Mumford’s ‘real’ drama. So to identify that kind of drama in sport doesn’t seem to be to identify anything that warrants the claim that there is a closer connection between sport and the aesthetic than we tend to think.  

iv. Players and athletes can be injured or defeated, but the same is true of actors, ‘who might sustain accidental injury and find something akin to defeat in a bad performance’ (Mumford, 2012: 56).

There are two observations one could make here. First, it is true that actors can sustain accidental injury, as can players and athletes, but in such cases it is the actor who is injured, not the character. In drama there is the possibility of things happening to the actor and the possibility of things happening to the character, but in sport there is only the possibility of things happening to the players and athletes because there is no equivalent of the character (see v below).

Second, a bad performance is not ‘something akin to defeat’ in the relevant sense of ‘defeat’. Defeat in the standard sense in which it is used in relation to sport gets its meaning from the fact that sport is a competitive enterprise with rules that determine what is required to win and what constitutes success and failure. To be defeated in sport is to be beaten, not just in any way, but, rather, in a very particular way, the details of which are provided by the rules that apply in the relevant specific sporting context. If an actor is defeated by the role of King Lear, he is not defeated in a rule-governed competition, but, rather, he finds it impossible to give a good performance because the role is too difficult for him to play well, either on a particular night, or generally. The fact we might use the word ‘defeat’ in each case does not mean that a sporting defeat and the defeat of a bad performance are the same thing, and Mumford seems to realise that in his use of ‘something akin’. The two uses of ‘defeat’ share, roughly, the notion of something being too much to manage (the opposition or the role of King Lear), but that is all.

v. As with the character in a play who falls in love with the leading lady (but not the actor), ‘[I]t is the sportsperson in their character that wins or loses the match’ (Mumford, 2012: 56).

As with ii above, this confuses the notions of a role and a character. Players have a role (such as left-back), but they don’t have a character in the sense in which an actor has a character to play. We shouldn’t confuse the fact that we might know things about the lives of players and athletes, with those players and athletes having characters. In that sense they have characters in the same way any person has a character, but that is not the sense in which an actor has a character to play. In the everyday sense in which everyone has a character, then the actor also has a character, but that is something that is true of the person. All actors have characters in that everyday sense when they are at home and not working, but there is no equivalent in sport to the character that the actor plays in the theatre, in a film, or in a television drama. Actors have to play characters whenever they act, players and athletes do not, although they may well have roles to play, but that is not the use of ‘role’ that is roughly equivalent to ‘part’ or ‘character’ in the theatrical sense. Rather, ‘role’ in the sporting context is something more closely related to a function. The left-back has the role of serving certain functions (say, for example, roughly a defensive function, generally in a certain part of the pitch, although that is to over-simplify the role and the functions that constitute the role).

vi. Outside of sport athletes and players may judge the successes and failures of their lives by other (non-sporting) criteria.

There’s nothing wrong with this as a general statement (although see Culbertson, 2005 for a discussion of the fact that it can often prove difficult). The issue here is not whether it is true that outside of sport athletes and players may judge the successes and failures of their lives by other, non-sporting, criteria, but what role that observation plays in Mumford’s argument. The answer seems to be that it shows that players and athletes have lives outside sport in the way actors have lives outside the theatre. However, that does not help to establish that when players and athletes are engaged in their sport, they are playing characters in the sense in which actors are playing characters when they are working. We might as well say that teachers, managers, shopkeepers, doctors, lawyers, and, for that matter, anyone employed in any capacity has a character to play in their job. Clearly, that is not the same thing as the actor playing a character, and as a consequence, the observation that players and athletes have lives that can be distinguished from what they do when they are playing sport (whether as a job or not) cannot contribute to an inference establishing the conclusion Mumford reaches (vii below).

vii. There are, therefore, ‘some closer parallels between art and sport’ (Mumford, 2012: 56); closer than Best accepts.






viii. ‘Drama can be found in other areas of life, outside the arts’ (Mumford, 2012: 56).

We use the term ‘drama’ and describe things as ‘dramatic’ outside of the arts, but that is a different use of those terms, and therefore they do not mean the same as they do when they are used in the arts. Drama in the theatre is not the imaginary form of something that we find in real life, but, rather, drama is something found in the arts and when we describe things outside the arts as ‘dramatic’ or say that there is drama in sport, we use the terms ‘dramatic’ and ‘drama’ figuratively.

Even if someone takes the view that there is no reason to view the use of ‘drama’ and ‘dramatic’ found in the arts as the dominant use, and other uses as figurative, there is still clearly a difference between the two uses being considered here. Drama in the arts involves creativity, imagination, playing a character by acting, and events happen to characters, not to actors. In cases outside the arts that we might describe as dramatic, events happen to people (in the case of sport to players and athletes), and creativity, imagination and playing characters by means of acting are not features of those kinds of case. So it just doesn’t seem to be that drama of the kind found in the arts can be found outside the arts, or, to put the thought another way, when we use the terms ‘drama’ and ‘dramatic’ in relation to the theatre, film and television drama, we use them in a different way from the use to which they are put when we employ them in contexts outside the arts, including in sport. In this case, to say that we use the terms differently is to say that they have different meanings within and outside the arts. If they have different meanings in those two contexts, then drawing attention to the fact that we use the same words in the two contexts is not to show that there is some single thing called ‘drama’ that can be found in the arts and outside the arts, and therefore that drama in the arts and drama in sport are the same thing. Equally, it does not show that the drama in sports constitutes an aesthetic dimension to sport.

ix. ‘Even if the drama of sport were to be indistinguishable in nature from drama in the arts, this would not make sport art’ (Mumford, 2012: 56). 

While it has been argued here that the drama of sport is significantly distinguishable in nature from drama in the arts, Mumford is quite right that sport is not art, and that even if the drama of sport and the drama of the arts were indistinguishable, that would not make sport art. 

In addition to considering each claim in the argument(s), it is also useful to consider some additional features of Mumford’s argument.

The use to which the example of a slap in the face is put. 

It would be very easy to infer too much from the observations Mumford makes in relation to this example, not least because the case of an actor slapping another actor in the face is distinctly different from almost anything else that might take place in a play, and it doesn’t happen often – a real slap is not the norm, rather a slap would usually be choreographed, and most of the skill is required by the person playing the character who is slapped. When an actor is required to really slap another actor in the face the other actor is really hit and may even be hurt. It isn’t the case that in such a situation it is only one character that slaps another. On the contrary, that kind of case is one where both the character and the actor are hit, but only the character is struck in anger. In that sense, the example Mumford uses appears to serve his argument because it involves a certain description in which the emphasis is on the slap, but that draws attention away from the fact that the character is struck in anger, but the actor is only struck because it is a requirement of the part. 

Someone might argue that a method actor really will strike another actor in anger, but that is not the case. A method actor may try to generate some anger, but it is a misunderstanding of method acting to think that in doing so the intentional object of that anger is the other actor. The method actor will draw on experiences from his or her own life to try to generate an emotional analogue for that of the character, but, as a consequence, the intentional object of that emotion will be someone or some thing other than that which the audience will be led to believe, and so it won’t be the other actor unless there is some genuine animosity between the two actors (or, as Elia Kazan is alleged to have once managed to do with Marlon Brando and Anthony Quinn, animosity is generated deliberately by the director’s lies and manipulations).

So Mumford’s example is problematic in two ways. First, it is an atypical kind of case, which doesn’t detract from Best’s point because it was never an exceptionless claim. Second, the idea that it is just one character who slaps another character ignores the fact that the actor who is slapped really is hit, and the actor who does the slapping really does hit the other person. So Mumford hasn’t found the counter example he appears to think he has. 

Mumford also seems to confuse a slap in the face for a tragedy. He notes that Best claims that tragedies happen to characters in a play, not to the actors (although, of course, Best is quite clear that tragedies can happen to actors – such as falling off the stage and dying from the resulting head wound – but that is rarely the case; there is nothing exceptionless about Best’s point). Mumford (2012: 53) then observes that the face of the actor who is slapped ‘is indeed smarting as he leaves the stage’. There are two things worth noting about that. First, it undermines his argument that is discussed in the paragraphs immediately above, where he needs it to just be the characters who are hit and do the hitting. Second, a slap in the face isn’t a tragedy, nor are fluffed lines or poor performances, which he also offers as examples. So Mumford’s (2012: 53) speculation that ‘perhaps Best has in mind the way in which a team or individual can be genuinely disappointed by their defeat or individual performance’ can be easily answered – ‘No, that isn’t what he has in mind!’ Best is very clear about that because that is one of the two uses of ‘tragic’ that he identifies as distinctly different from the use we make of the term in relation to the theatre. In fact, Best (1978: 119) calls that use of the term ‘irritatingly prevalent but barbarously debased’.

The idea that tragedies are real in sport, but unreal in the theatre. 

Mumford (2012: 53) also seems to think that Best could be claiming that tragedies, such as players and athletes dying or being seriously injured can happen in sport, but in art the tragedies aren’t real. So in sport tragedies happen to the players and athletes, but in the theatre they only happen to the characters. That thought may be prompted by the observation that in contrast to the fact that tragedies happen to characters in the theatre, tragic events in sport do happen to the athletes and players. So while the actor playing the part of Gloucester in King Lear does not have his eyes put out, the character (Gloucester) does. This is in stark contrast to the fact that, for example, Jim Clark, Jochen Rindt, Jo Siffert, Ronnie Peterson, Gilles Villeneuve, Ayrton Senna, Jules Bianchi and countless others really were killed in motor-racing accidents, and Nikki Lauda really does bear the scars of the accident at the Nürburgring in 1976 that very nearly killed him.

That of course, is not Best’s inference. On the contrary, he is quite clear about the fact that tragedies can happen to actors during a play (or, we might add, during filming), but tragedies can, in principal, happen to anyone at any time. The point that Best is making is that tragedy in one sense of the term (the portrayal of undeserved misfortune of significant magnitude) is a standard part of drama, but that in that sense it is not something that happens to the actors, but to the characters. Tragedy, in that sense, is no part of sport, so when tragedies occur in sport, they are never of the kind that we find in drama, but rather tragedy that happens to the players, athletes or spectators, and so tragedy in another sense (terrible things happening to real people). Such tragedy can happen during a play, the making of a film or television drama, and when it does, it is the actors and crew who suffer the tragedy, but that is not part of drama, and is rather, tragedy in a sense in which everyone and anyone could experience; it has nothing to do with the conventions of drama. So finding examples of tragedy happening to actors does not undermine the distinction Best draws. Indeed, it is not even an observation about the distinction Best draws.

Winners and losers and victories and defeats in sport are real, whereas they are only imaginary in drama. 
















BEST, D. 1978. Philosophy and Human Movement. London: George Allen & Unwin.

BEST, D. 1982. “The Aesthetic and the Artistic.” Philosophy, 57 (221, Jul. 1982): 357-72.

BEST, D. 1985a. “Sport is Not Art”, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport XII: 25-40.

BEST, D. 1985b. Feeling and Reason in the Arts. London: George Allen & Unwin.

BEST, D. 1992. The Rationality of Feeling: Understanding the Arts in Education. London: The Falmer Press.

CULBERTSON, L. 2005. “The Paradox of Bad Faith and Elite Competitive Sport.” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport XXXII (1): 65-86.

CULBERTSON, L. 2012. “Pandora Logic: Rules, Moral Judgement and the Fundamental Principles of Olympism.” Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 6 (2): 195-210.

CULBERTSON, L. 2015. “Perception, Aspects and Explanation: Some Remarks on Moderate Partisanship.” Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 9 (2): 182-204.

CULBERTSON, L. 2016a. “Scylla and Charybdis: the purist’s dilemma.” Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 10 (2): 175-96.

CULBERTSON, L. 2016b. “Intention, Description and the Aesthetic: The By-product Argument.” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 43 (3): 440-53.

CULBERTSON, L. forthcoming. “Logic, Rules and Intention: The Principal Aim Argument.” Sport, Ethics and Philosophy.

CULBERTSON, L. and MCFEE, G. 2016. “The Best Way to Locate a Purpose in Sport: In Defence of a Distinction for Aesthetics?” Aesthetic Investigations 1 (2): 191-213.

MUMFORD, S. 2012. Watching Sport: Aesthetics, Ethics and Emotions. Abingdon: Routledge.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.










^1	  I stress that ‘Mumford finds’ those arguments in Best (1978) because I have argued elsewhere (Culbertson, forthcoming) that what I call ‘the principal aim argument’ is not actually Best’s argument, but rather that Best makes an apparently similar, but significantly different, argument from that which Mumford attributes to him.  
^2	  Perhaps not univocal because if Mumford acknowledges that expressions such as ‘the art of politics’ and ‘the theatre of war’ employ the terms ‘art’ and ‘theatre’ in a derivative sense, then it may be the case that he would acknowledge that there are some derivative uses of ‘drama’, although it’s not obvious that he does.
